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Time goes fast. This year, we celebrate ETMP’s 15th anniversary. As editors, we are, of course,
glad that the journal has developed into one of the leading journals in moral philosophy. The
success of a new project depends on a lot of contingent factors which are beyond the control of
those who start it. We are therefore grateful to our authors, reviewers, associate editors,
members of our editorial board, and our publisher for their good work and their support. As
to the reviewers, in this issue we include a list of colleagues who reviewed one ormore papers in
the previous year. We cannot offer them more than recognition of their valuable work.
We also owe gratitude to Michael Quante and Andreas Vieth, the German members of our
editorial team, They had to leave the editorial team because of other challenges and duties.
Michael was Associate Editor since 2005. Because of his expertise and network in both
Continental and Anglo-Saxon analytic moral philosophy, he was extremely qualified for his
job. He was the initiator of number of interesting special issues some of which still have to
appear. It was a pleasure to work with Michael. He is a very fast worker with a broad
overview of both theoretical and practical ethics, and sound judgements on the quality of
papers. Michael is succeeded by Thomas Schramme of Hamburg University. Many thanks
also to Andreas Vieth. He was Book Review Editor for the German speaking world since
2009. He provided us with valuable reviews of books, written in English or German, by
authors from that part of the world. His successor is Tim Henning of Giessen University.
While we thought it desirable to have some new blood in the Editorial Board, we asked a
number of members to make place for younger colleagues. Thanks to former board members
Sven Andersen, Monique Canto-Sperber, Dagfinn Føllesdal, Carl-Henric Grenholm, Alex
Mauron, Dietmar Mieth, Nenad Miscevic, Edgar Morscher, Denis Müller, Herta Nagl-Docekal,
Roger Shiner, Holmer Steinfath, and Arne Johan Vetlesen for what they did for the journal.
Part of this issue is dedicated to Amartya Sen’s The idea of justice (2009). Many political
philosophers think that a crucial goal of political philosophy is to identify a perfectly just
society. Amartya Sen disagrees. In The Idea of Justice, he argues that the proper goal of an
inquiry about justice is to undertake comparative assessments of feasible social scenarios in
order to identify reforms that involve justice-enhancement, or injustice reduction. Identify-
ing ‘perfect’ justice and comparing imperfect social states are ‘analytically disjoined’. In his
contribution, Martijn Boot refutes Sen’s thesis by demonstrating that to be able to make
adequate comparisons we need to identify and integrate criteria of comparison. This is,
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according to Boot, precisely the aim of a theory of justice (such as John Rawls’s theory):
identifying, integrating and ordering relevant principles of justice. Boot argues that the same
integrated criteria that determine ‘perfect’ justice enable us to compare imperfect social
states. Conceding that Sen’s arguments for his comparative approach may not be as
convincing as he thought, Jan Drydyk contends in his contribution to the special issue, that
there are additional arguments for it, and one is that it provides a unique and valuable
platform on which an account of justice as a virtue of social and political actors (including
institutions and social movements) can be built. Hence new dimensions of comparison are
opened up: some actors are better disposed and more successful than others at leading social
change in the direction of greater justice. Drydyk’s main objective is to use the capability
approach to construct such an account. Six dimensions of acting justly are identified: (1)
reducing capability shortfalls; (2) expanding capabilities for all; (3) saving the worst-off as a
first step towards their full participation in economy and society, (4) which is also to be
promoted by a system of entitlements protecting all from social exclusion; while (5)
supporting the empowerment of those whose capabilities are to expand; and (6) respecting
ethical values and legitimate procedures. In his contribution, guest editor Pablo Gilabert
pursues two tasks, one critical and the other constructive. First, he argues that Sen’s account
of the contrast between the transcendental and the comparative approaches is not convinc-
ing, and second, he suggests what he takes to be a broader and more plausible account of
comparative assessments of justice. The core claim is that political philosophers should not
shy away from the pursuit of ambitious theories of justice (including, for example, ideal
theories of perfect justice), although they should engage in careful consideration of issues of
political feasibility bearing on their practical implementation.
The issue continues with an article by Cristian Constantinescu on value incomparability.
Two competing accounts of value incomparability have been put forward in the recent
literature. According to the standard account, developed most famously by Joseph Raz,
‘incomparability’ means determinate failure of the three classic value relations (better than,
worse than, and equally good): two value-bearers are incomparable with respect to a value V
if and only if (i) it is false that x is better than y with respect to V, (ii) it is false that x is worse
than y with respect to V and (iii) it is false that x and y are equally good with respect to V.
Most philosophers have followed Raz in adopting this account of incomparability. Recently,
however, John Broome has advocated an alternative view, on which value incomparability is
explained in terms of vagueness or indeterminacy. Constantinescu aims to further Broome’s
view in two ways. Firstly, he wants to supply independent reasons for thinking that the
phenomenon of value incomparability is indeed a matter of the indeterminacy inherent in our
comparative predicates. Secondly, he attempts to defend Broome’s account by warding off
several objections that worry him, due mainly to Erik Carlson and Ruth Chang.
The issue of comparability returns in the next article, by Barbro Fröding and Martin
Peterson. Their aim is to contribute to the discussion on the nature of choice in virtue theory.
If several different actions are available to the virtuous agent, they are also likely to vary in
their degree of virtue, at least in some situations. Yet, it is widely agreed that once an action
is recognised as virtuous there is no higher level of virtue. Fröding and Peterson discuss how
the virtue theorist could accommodate both these seemingly conflicting ideas from a modern
Aristotelian perspective, as opposed to a purely exegetic one. They propose a way of
resolving what seems to be a major clash between two central features of virtue ethics.
Their proposal is based on the notion of parity, a concept which recently has received
considerable attention in the literature on axiology. Briefly put, two alternatives are on a par
(or are ‘roughly equal’) if they are comparable, although it is not the case that one is better
than the other, nor that they are equally good.
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In the next contribution, Andrew Jordan & Stephanie Partridge comment on Justin D’Arms
& Daniel Jacobson’s argument that all extant neo-sentimentalists are guilty of a conflation error
that they call themoralistic fallacy. One commits themoralistic fallacy when one infers from the
fact that it would be morally wrong to experience an affective attitude—e.g., it would be wrong
to be amused—that the attitude does not fit its object—e.g., that it is not funny. The authors
agree with D’Arms & Jacobson that a strong moralizing of humour is wrongheaded and that
jokes can be quite funny even in cases where we have a compelling moral reason to not be
amused. However, the authors argue that moral considerations can be relevant for property
ascription. On their view, in order for a joke to be funny, a properly sensitive agent must take
herself to have a contributory reason to be amused, and in some cases that she lacks such a
reason is best explained by appeal to moral considerations. The authors use this constraint as the
basis of what they call a modest proposal for a modest sentimentalism.
Hanno Sauer’s contribution aims, first, to assess the evidence in favour of the claim that
emotions are both necessary and sufficient for moral judgement, and, second, to show how a
moderate rationalist position about moral judgement can be defended nonetheless. After
presenting the experimental evidence for both the necessity- and the sufficiency-thesis, he
argues that a rationalist about moral judgement can be happy to accept the necessity-thesis.
His argument draws on the idea that emotions play the same role for moral judgement that
perceptions play for ordinary judgements about the external world. Sauer develops a
rationalist interpretation of the sufficiency-thesis and shows that it can successfully account
for the available empirical evidence. The general idea is that the rationalist can accept the
claim that emotional reactions are sufficient for moral judgement just in case a subject’s
emotional reaction towards an action in question causes the judgment in a way that can be
reflectively endorsed under conditions of full information and rationality.
In the last contribution, Shay Welch goes into feminist critique on traditional, liberal
theories of consent and obligation. Though none have proposed abandoning obligation
outright, there has been a general shift among feminists towards a responsibility paradigm.
Responsibility models acknowledge given relationships and interdependence, and so posit
responsibilities as given, regardless of whether they are voluntary. Welch argues that in
theories that take freedom as a principal value, a move from a socially un-embedded
voluntarism to socially embedded responsibility leaves something missing. Constructive
accounts of and prescriptions for freedom must consider the reality of social life; yet
acknowledging that relations are given need not require subordinating the role of volunta-
rism and consent in most relationships. Welch’s alternative is a commitment framework that
seeks to supplant obligation while also reconciling relational given-ness and voluntarism.
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